The basic paradox of nuclear deterrence is that weapons too dangerous to use in war are threatened in order to prevent war. Risks and tradeoffs in NC3 have been inherent since the Cold War, but modern information technology heightens system complexity significantly, compounding additional problems created by nuclear multipolarity and the interdependence of nuclear and conventional command and control. Offensive cyber operations targeting NC3 introduce a number of underappreciated risks of organizational breakdown, decision making confusion, and rational incentives to misrepresent the balance of power in a nuclear crisis. Given the broad diffusion of cyber capabilities, furthermore, most nuclear weapon states also have some ability to do so, although the operational difficulties of gaining remote access to and covert control over NC3 cannot be overstated. Adversaries have incentives to penetrate NC3 for intelligence in peacetime and for counterforce in wartime. As NC3 increasingly uses digital technologies to enhance efficiency and reliability, the cybersecurity of NC3 becomes a pressing concern. Operational warheads, delivery platforms, and early warning satellites must be linked to political leaders and military commanders via a nuclear command, control, and communication (NC3) network. A system of supporting technologies and organizations is required to make credible nuclear threats. LINDSAY CYBER OPERATIONS AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS JUNE 20, 2019Ī nuclear weapon alone does not a deterrent make.
Readers should note that Nautilus seeks a diversity of views and opinions on significant topics in order to identify common ground.Ī podcast with Jon Lindsay, Peter Hayes, and Philip Reiner on cyber operations and nuclear weapons is found here.īanner image is by Lauren Hostetter of Heyhoss Design. The views expressed in this report do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Nautilus Institute.
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Lindsay is assistant professor at the Munk School of Global Affairs & Public Policy and the Department of Political Science at the University of Toronto.Īcknowledgments: The workshop was funded by the John D.
Offensive cyber operations targeting NC3 introduce a number of underappreciated risks of organizational breakdown, decision making confusion, and rational miscalculation in a nuclear crisis.” In this essay, Jon Lindsay argues that “As NC3 increasingly uses digital technologies to enhance efficiency and reliability, the cybersecurity of NC3 becomes a pressing concern.
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